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have a place in suits by passengers against their drivers or third per-
sons; that when the issue of contributory negligence is submitted to
the jury, it should be given under more specific instructions; and that
the alleged contributory negligence should be tested from the time the
passenger starts his trip, not just after the emergency situation has
been created.
If the doctrine of contributory negligence is to be abolished, how-
ever, then let the legislature so legislate, or let the courts so state.
If, as seems to be the case today, the doctrine is dying, with the ex-
ceptions mentioned above, then let the courts say that. But the con-
tinuation of a doctrine with a fine general rule and many exceptions
and restrictive applications which pluck it bare of substance, only con-
fuses the legal community, makes many decisions incomprehensible,
and fails to add to the orderly administration of justice in a world
already beset with more than enough complexities.
JAMES A. YOUNG
FELA, Negligence, and Jury Trials
-Speculation Upon A Scintilla
I. PERSPECTIVE
It is a reproach to our civilization that any class of American work-
men should, in the pursuit of a necessary and useful vocation, be sub-jected to a peril of life and limb as great as that of a soldier in time of
war.1
This denunciation of the lamentable plight of railroad workers
was delivered by President Harrison in 1889. The perils of which
he spoke were indeed great; a compilation of on-the-job casualties
suffered by American railroaders for the single year ending June 30,
1888, showed 2,070 deaths and 20,148 injuries.2 In 1888, the odds
of a brakeman dying a natural death were 1 in 4.7 ;8 the average life
expectancy after one became a switchman was seven years. 4
The social impact of this appalling "human overhead" of the
railroad industry incited a demand for legislation to protect railroad
employees - a demand which became very insistent in the decade
from 1880 to 1890.' The immediate result of this demand was the
enactment of the first Safety Appliance Act,6 in 1893, which provided
1. S. REP. No. 1049, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892), as quoted in Johnson v. Southern
Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1, 19 (1904).
2. THIRD AwNuAL REPORT OF THE INTiERSTATE COMMERC COMMIssION 294 (1889).
3. Id. at 85.
4. Symposium- Railroad Liability, 25 TENN. I. REV. 123, 144 (1958).
5. Kennedy, Federal Employers' Liability Act, 8 TENN. L. REV. 213 (1930).
6. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
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that trains and other equipment engaged in interstate commerce must
be equipped with certain safety devices.
The promulgation of this statute, however, slackened only tem-
porarily the demand for legislation. The problems of railroaders
were too broad to be alleviated by the mere establishment of mini-
mum safety standards. Effective though such standards might be,
some workers would still be injured, and practically insurmountable
obstacles would still block all avenues to compensation. The devel-
opment of rules of law as to an employee's right to recover from his
employer for work-connected injuries had been tempered by the pol-
icy that the risk must outweigh the utility or social value of the act
in order for liability to be imposed.' During the nineteenth cen-
tury, the social value of railroads had been tremendous; the growth
of the industry had been essential to the development of our country.
Heavy governmental subsidization of railroads reflected their im-
portance. It has been estimated that government aid to railroads
was equivalent to 40 per cent of the costs of all railroads in existence
in 1870.8 Because of the social value of the railroad industry, the
law evolved in such a way as to give the greatest possible benefit to
railroads. Thus, tort law developed the fellow servant rule and the
doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk, the
consequence of which was to effectively extinguish most railroad
workers' rights of recovery against their employer.
By the turn of the century, however, the picture was somewhat
different. The railroads had become sufficiently established to en-
able them to share the financial burden of deaths and injuries to em-
ployees, and to absorb the cost as an expense of their business. Fur-
thermore, there was a great public clamor to relieve the railroad em-
ployee of the harsh defenses which the law had developed to protect
an expanding infant industry.' One of the leaders in this campaign
was President Theodore Roosevelt, who, in 1907, made the follow-
ing remarks:
The practice of putting the entire burden of loss of life or limb
upon the victim or the victim's family is a form of social injustice in
which the United States stands in an unenviable position.10
As a result of this agitation, Congress enacted the second" Federal
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 291-93 (1934).
8. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: RATES AND REGULATIONS 39 (1911).
9. Kennerly, Federal Employers Liability Act, 8 TENN. L. REV. 213, 214 (1930). For a
general description of the early efforts toward passage of FELA, see Griffith, The Vindication
of a National Public Policy Under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 18 LAW & CONTEmP.
PROB. 160 (1953).
10. 42 CONG. REc. 73 (1907).
11. The first Federal Employers' Liability Act, 34 Stat. 232 (1906), was declared unconsti-
tutional because of its application to intrastate commerce. The Employers' Liability Cases, 207
U.S. 463 (1908).
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Employers' Liability Act' in 1908. This was a declaration of pub.
lic policy "... based upon the failure of the common law rules as to
liability for accidents to meet modern industrial conditions ...,".
designed to achieve the broad purpose of promoting "... the welfare
of both employer and employee, by adjusting the losses and injuries
inseparable from industry and commerce to the strength of those who
in the nature of the case ought to share the burden."' 4
The pertinent provisions of the first section of FELA are as fol-
lows:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce be-
tween any of the several States ... shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce, or, in the case of the death of such employee, to his or her
personal representative ... for such injury or death resulting in whole
or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees
of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed,
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.'"
Probably the most essential thing to note about this act is that it is a
negligence statute, and not a workmen's compensation law. The
revolutionary aspect of FELA was not what it created (a form of
social insurance), but, rather, what it destroyed (the common-law
fellow servant rule). Another section 6 of the act substituted a rule
of comparative negligence for the absolute bar of contributory negli-
gence. Under the new rule damages are reduced by the jury in pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributable to the employee.
The first thirty years of FELA saw a great expansion in the use of
the defense of assumption of risk,' 7 so the act was amended in 1939
to abolish that last remaining vestige of the common law's triumvi-
rate of defenses.'"
On its face, then, FELA purports to retain negligence as the basis
of liability, and it would seem to incorporate a pre-existing body of
negligence law which has long been familiar to both bench and bar.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the extent to which judi-
cial administration of the act has proved this proposition to be true
in regard to the traditional rules governing the functions of judge
12. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1952). Declared constitutional in Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
13. SENATE JuDIciARY COMMITrEE REP OT, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1910).
14. S. REP. No. 460, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1908), quoted in Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific
LR., 356 U.S. 326, 330 (1958).
15. 35 Stat 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
16. 35 Stat 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1952).
17. Metzenbaum and Schwartz, Defenses Under the F.E.L.A., 17 OHIO ST. LJ. 416, 421
(1956).
18. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1952); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318
U.S. 54 (1943).
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and jury, with particular emphasis upon the standard of proof which
the practitioner will be required to meet in order to get his FELA
case to the jury. 9
ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN JUDGE AND JURY
Standards of Proof in non-FELA Cases
It is, of course, fundamental to our jury system that questions of
fact are for the jury, and questions of law must be decided by the
court. This division of functions, however, is not nearly that sim-
ple. The decision of which issues shall even be submitted to a jury
is often fraught with difficulty since the court has the duty to with-
hold from the jury questions upon which reasonable men could not
differ.2" Probably the most common method of control over the jury
is the directed verdict, whereby the court peremptorily instructs the
jury to return a verdict for one of the parties and enters judgment
accordingly.21 Of primary importance to the practitioner, then, is
the test which the court will use in determining whether to direct a
verdict. The law has at various times recognized three different
tests.
The earliest test employed by the federal courts in determining
whether to direct a verdict was the so-called "scintilla" rule.22 When
following this rule the court may not direct a verdict against a pro-
ponent if there is a "scintilla" of evidence supporting his case. A
"scintilla" has been defined as the "least particle, '23 or, in more
prosaic language, as "... merely a tittle, a glimmer, a minute particle,
or an atom of evidence ... . In determining whether there is a
scintilla, the court may consider only such evidence as is favorable to
the party against whom the direction is sought, irrespective of the
weight of the evidence adduced by the other party. The mass of
evidence presented by both parties is not weighed by the court until
a verdict is returned and a motion for a new trial is made on the
ground that the verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evi-
dence. The scintilla rule was abandoned by the English courts in
19. This paper concentrates upon federal cases. FELA grants concurrent jurisdiction to state
courts. 35 Star. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1952). It has been held, however, that federal
case law governs state court actions: "... what constitutes negligence for the statute's purposes
is a federal question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence
applicable under state and local laws for other purposes. Federal decisional law formulating
and applying the concept governs." Erie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949).
20. PROSSER, TORTS § 39 (2d ed. 1955).
21. For an informative and exhaustive treatise on directed verdicts, see Blume, Origin and
Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH. L. REV. 555 (1950).
22. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940).
23. BLACK, LAW DICrioNARY 1513 (4th ed. 1951).
24. Cleveland-Akron Bag Co. v. Jaite, 112 Ohio St. 506, 511, 148 N.E. 82, 84 (1925).
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1857,25 and by the United States Supreme Court in 1872.26 The rule
has also been abandoned by most state courts.2 7
After the rejection of the scintilla rule, there arose what could be
called a "reasonable inference" rule. Under this rule, if there is any
evidence from which the 'jury might reasonably infer the ultimate
facts necessary to establish the proponent's case, the court may not
direct a verdict against him.28 It must be noted that the difference
between this test and the scintilla rule is merely one of degree, since
both require the court to examine only the evidence adduced by the
party against whom the directed verdict is sought. Both of these
rules are open to the criticism that their operation could, at least in
theory, lead to a succession of new trials, because of the fact that the
judge's consideration of the aggregate of the evidence is postponed
until the motion is made for a new trial after a verdict has been re-
turned.
Largely as a result of this criticism, a third rule, which may be
called the "new trial" test, developed in the federal courts. By this
test, the court must direct a verdict if, upon review of all the evidence
adduced by both parties, it would be bound to set aside a verdict for
one party as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. This
rule overcomes the objection found in the theoretical possibility of a
succession of jury trials, and differs from the first two rules in that
it gives the court maximum control over the jury.29 The federal
courts have adhered to this rule in non-FELA litigation up to the
present time.30
Standards of Proof in FEL Cases
In the early cases under FELA the new trial test was apparently
the one used to determine whether a verdict would be directed. Prob-
ably the leading case, and one which well illustrates the operation of
the rule, is Pennsylvania R. R. v. Chamberlain,8' decided in 1933.
Plaintiff's decedent had been piloting a string of cars down a slope
when he fell off and was run over by another string of cars. The
plaintiff's case was founded upon the theory that the second string
of cars had been negligently allowed to collide with the first. There
were no eye-witnesses to the event except plaintiff's one witness, who
25. Toomey v. London Ry., 3 C.B. (n.s.) 146, 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (1857).
26. Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1872).
27. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494 (3d ed. 1940).
28. Ibid.
29. Smith, The Power of the Judge to Direct a Verdict, 24 COLM. L. REv. 111 (1924).
30. Note, 47 MCIH. L. REv. 974, 983 (1949); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Feaster,
259 F.2d 210 (10th Cir. 1958); Murray v. Towers, 239 F.2d 914, 916 (D.C. Cit. 1956);
Taran Distributing, Inc. v. Ami, Inc., 237 F.2d 488, 490 (7th Cit. 1956); United States v.
J. E. Bohannon Co., 232 F.2d 756, 758 (6th Cit. 1956).
31. 288 U.S. 333 (1933).
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was 900 feet away from the scene of the accident. He testified that
he heard a crash and then looked up and saw the two strings of cars
together. Three other witnesses, however, testified that they had
been on the cars in question and that there had been no such collision.
Under either the scintilla rule or even the reasonable inference rule,
this case could probably have gone to the jury, since only the plain-
tiff's evidence could be considered upon defendant's motion for a
directed verdict. The trial court, however, directed a verdict for the
defendant, plainly applying the new trial test. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that no verdict based upon a statement so unbe-
lievable could be sustained as against the positive testimony to the
contrary by defendant's unimpeached witnesses. The court used the
following language:
. . before evidence may be left to the jury, there is a preliminary ques-
ion for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether
there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for
the party producing it upon whom the onus of proof is imposed. . . . The
rule is settled for the federal courts, and for many of the state courts, that
whenever in the trial of a civil case the evidence is clearly such that if a
verdict were rendered for one of the parties the other would be entitled
to a new trial, it is -the duty of the judge to direct the jury to find ac-
cording to the views of the court.... The scintilla rule has been defi-
nitely and repeatedly rejected as far as the federal courts are concerned. 2
The rule of Chamberlain prevailed in FELA litigation until the
1942 term of the Supreme Court. This Court rendered the first of
a series of decisions which cast great doubt on the status of the new
trial test. In Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry. 3 and Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R.,34 the Court reversed lower court holdings that no
jury question had been presented, without making clear the test it ap-
plied. The general tenor of both opinions, however, indicates that
only the plaintiff's evidence was considered in deciding that the case
should have gone to the jury.
In 1944, the Court made a clearer statement of its position in
Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry.35 The court of appeals36 had
held that the case was improperly submitted to the jury, there being
insufficient evidence on the issue of causation. The Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court, holding that a jury question had been
presented. Using language indicating that it was not operating under
the new trial test, the Court said: "Upon an examination of the rec-
ord we cannot say that the inference drawn by this jury that re-
32. Id. at 343.
33. 319 U.S. 350 (1943).
34. 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
35. 321 U.S. 29 (1944).
36. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 134 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1943).
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spondent's negligence caused the fatal accident is without support in
the evidence."'87
In 1949, all suspicions that the Supreme Court was changing its
test for directed verdicts in FELA cases were confirmed by the
language of Wilkerson v. McCarthy."8  In that case, evidence that
the plaintiff slipped and fell into an open pit while attempting to
cross over it on a greasy plank was held to have raised a jury ques-
tion, despite evidence of a safe route being available. Mr. Justice
Black, in announcing the opinion of the Court, said:
It is the established rule that in passing upon whether there is suf-
ficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury we need only look to the
evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to support the case of a
litigant against whom a peremptory instruction has been given.39
As has been noted above, there is considerable doubt as to whether
this rule could properly be termed "established"; indeed, one author
has challenged the statement as being "incorrect.
' 40
While Mr. Justice Black's statement may be inaccurate as to non-
FELA cases, or as to FELA cases prior to 1943, it is certainly an ac-
curate description of the state of the law in FELA litigation since
that date, and it has been subsequently quoted with approval.41 The
Chamberlain4 case has never been expressly overruled, but rather
just ignored. In place of the new trial test, as applied in that case,
there has been substituted a rule requiring that the judge look only
to the plaintiff's evidence in determining whether to order a directed
verdict. Thus, the court is applying either the scintilla rule, or the
reasonable inference rule. As previously noted, the difference is
merely one of degree, since both rules call for a viewing of only one
side of the evidence. Certain language of the Court in Rogers 'v.
Missouri Pacific R. R.43 indicated that the reasonable inference rule
was being adopted:
Judicial appraisal of the proof to determine whether a jury question
is presented -is narrowly limited to the single inquiry whether, with
reason, the conclusion may be drawn that negligence of the employer
played any part at all in the injury or death.44
However, recent cases indicate that the degree of evidence which the
Court is willing to say permits a reasonable inference, approaches the
37. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944).
38. 336U.S. 53 (1949).
39. Id. at 57.
40. Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MIcH. L REV. 555, 580
(1950).
41. See, e.g., Webb v. Illinois Central R.R., 352 U.S. 512, 514 (1957).
42. Pennsylvania R.1. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333 (1933), discussed in text, supra note
32.
43. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
44. Id. at 507.
1959] NOTES
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
scintilla category. As Mr. Justice Harlan observed, in his dissenting
opinion in the Rogers case:
... in judging these cases, the Court appears to me to have departed from
these long established standards, for, as I read these opinions, the implica-
tion seems to be that the question, at least as to the element of causation,
is not whether the evidence is sufficient to convince a reasoning man,
but whether there is a scintilla of evidence at all to justify the jury ver-
dicts. 45
Leading Cases and Recent Developments
The question of just exactly how much evidence will be required
of the FELA practitioner to get his case to the jury is highly impor-
tant. An almost unbroken line of recent Supreme Court decisions has
indicated that the trend is toward requiring less evidence, as com-
pared to both non-FELA cases and to early cases under that act. In
order that some conclusions may be reached as to the correct test to
be employed in directing a verdict, and as to the quantum of evidence
needed to meet this test, an examination of certain leading cases and
recent developments is appropriate.
Nowhere is the trend of requiring less evidence to send a case to
the jury more apparent than in a series of cases on the question of
causation. The earlier view is illustrated by the Coogan46 case, de-
cided in 1926. In that case, there had been no eye-witnesses to the
death of a brakeman who was run over by a train. Plaintiff's evi-
dence showed that there was a bent air pipe close to the rails which
could have caused the decedent to trip and fall beneath the train's
wheels. While conceding that the existence of the bent pipe might
have been some evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad,
the Supreme Court set aside a jury verdict, holding that causation
had not been established. The Court stated that permitting the case
to go to the jury would be to allow mere speculation, since it was just
as possible that the bent air pipe did not contribute to the death.
Contrast that case with the Tennant47 case, decided in 1944. The
latter case also involved an unwitnessed death; there was no evidence
as to how decedent happened to be run over, nor of his exact loca-
tion at the time. The case had been submitted to the jury on the
allegation that the death had been caused by the railroad's negligence
in failing to ring a bell before moving the engine. The court of ap-
peals,4" following the reasoning of the Coogan case, held that the
case should not have gone to the jury, since the jury could only specu-
late 'on the issue of causation, there being no substantial proof that
failure to ring the bell was the proximate cause of the death. In
45. Id. at 564 (dissenting opinion).
46. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472 (1926).
47. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29 (1944).
48. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 134 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1943).
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this case, however, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a jury
issue existed.
A comparison of the two cases immediately preceding leads to
the conclusion that the plaintiff is not now required to produce nearly
so much' evidence of causation in fact as was required under the
earlier cases. If he. can introduce some evidence that the railroad
was negligent in some particular, which could have caused the injury,
the case will be sent to the jury, despite the lack of positive evidence
as to causation. That this is true is shown by the famous Lavender49
case decided in 1946.
That case involved the standard situation of an unwitnessed in-
jury: a switch-tender had been found dead beside the tracks just after
a train had gone by at a speed of 8-10 miles per hour. His death
was caused by a blow on the back of his head. The plaintiff's theory
was that he had been struck by a mail-hook that had been negligently
allowed to protrude from the passing train. There was no evidence
that any hook actually had been so protruding, and the plaintiff's
case was mathematically questionable, in that the decedent was 672
inches tall and the mail-hooks were 73 inches above the top of the
rails. The railroad's theory was that the man had been murdered
by a tramp; this theory was buttressed by the fact that his wallet was
missing, and by expert medical testimony that the cause of death
could have been a blow from a pipe or dub. The Supreme Court of
Missouri" had held that the plaintiff had failed to make a prima
facie case, it being mere speculation and conjecture to say that the
decedent had been struck by a mail-hook. The Supreme Court again
reversed, holding that the case had been properly submitted to the
jury, and relying heavily upon some meager and conflicting evidence
as to the existence of some mounds of dirt upon which the decedent
could have been standing to build his height up to 73 inches. In re-
gard to the matter of speculation emphasized by the lower court, the
Supreme Court had this to say:
It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation
and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such
that fair-minded men may draw different -inferences, a measure of specu-
lation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to
settle -the dispute -by choosing what seems to be -the most reasonable infer-
ence. Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to sup-
port the conclusion reached does reversible error appear.51 (Italics added.)
These cases demonstrate that the lack of positive evidence of
causation will seldom keep a case from the jury today. If some evi-
49. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
50. Lavender v. Kurn, 354 Mo. 196, 189 S.W.2d 253 (1945).
51. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). This statement has been quoted with
approval in later cases: Webb v. Illinois Central R.R., 352 U.S. 512, 513 (1957); Watn v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 255 F.2d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1958).
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dence of a negligent act, affirmative or inferential, is available, the
plaintiff will get to the jury.
Closely related to the problem of causation is the question of con-
tributory negligence. As noted, contributory negligence is not an
absolute bar under FELA, but rather will merely operate to reduce
the amount of the verdict in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court has been steadfast
in its determination that the jury decide whether the plaintiff's own
conduct was the sole cause of his injury. In Rogers v. Missouri Pa-
cific R. R.,52 the plaintiff had been burning weeds with a hand torch
near a track. He had been instructed to observe passing trains for
"hot-boxes," and while so doing he was forced to retreat from the
flames fanned by the passing train. He retreated too far, however,
and fell into a culvert. The Supreme Court held that a jury question
had been presented, since:
Under this statute, the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofsjustify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any
part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which dam-
ages are sought.53 (Italics added.)
A later case carried this idea to a virtually inexplicable extreme.
A mail and baggage handler was pushing a cart along a platform be-
tween two moving trains. The end of the cart swung against one of
the trains throwing the plaintiff against the train on the opposite
track. The platform was not overcrowded, the only other carts be-
ing some distance ahead and moving in the same direction as the one
pushed by the plaintiff. In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court
held that the case could properly be submitted to a jury.54
In addition to the relaxation of requirements in the area of cau-
sation, a similar relaxation has recently been manifested in regard to
the type of conduct which will give rise to an inference of a violation
of the railroad's duty to use due care. Again, this can best be shown
by a comparison of cases. In 1928, the failure to remove water
which the railroad knew collected at a certain spot on its platform
over which its employees were required to walk, was held not to be
a violation of any duty owed to an employee who had slipped and
fallen on the frozen spot.55
By 1957, however, a landmark case in FELA litigation provided
a nice contrast to illustrate the changing pattern in the administra-
tion of the law. In Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,56 the plain-
tiff, having partaken of a purgative potion prior to reporting for
work, experienced an urgent call of nature while on the job. Finding
52. 352 U.S. 500 (1957).
53. Id. at 506.
54. Moore v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 358 U.S. 31 (1958).
55. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Aeby, 275 U.S. 426 (1928).
56. 354 U.S. 901 (1957).
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the normal route to the facilities appointed for such activities blocked
by a passing train, and being unwilling or unable to wait, he climbed
into a loaded gondola car to defecate. While so occupied, he was in-
jured when the car was nudged in a switching operation, causing some
of the freight to slip and crush his leg. The majority of the Supreme
Court seized upon the fact that there was evidence that the defendant
knew that its employees occasionally used empty gondola cars in lieu
of toilets, and held that a jury question had been presented on the
issue of breach of duty, notwithstanding the fact that this particular
car had been loaded with freight and stood upon a track normally
used for switching. This case indicates the importance of presenting
some evidence that the railroad knew of a given condition or practice,
because it appears that if this known factor is in some way connected
with the injury, the case will go to the jury.
One concluding general observation is that if a plaintiff can sug-
gest some action on the part of the railroad that might have pre.
vented the injury, his case will probably get to the jury. This was
briefly illustrated in two recent cases. In Cahill v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford R. R.,57 a brakeman, who had been temporarily
ordered to direct traffic at a grade crossing, was injured when a
truck which he had halted moved forward and threw him against the
passing train. Suit was brought, not against the owner of the truck,
but against the railroad. A verdict for the plaintiff was set aside by
the court of appeals on the ground that neither negligence nor proxi-
mate cause had been established. The Supreme Court reversed, how-
ever, apparently upon the ground that the railroad's failure to in-
struct the plaintiff in proper methods of traffic direction could have
prevented the injury. A similar result was reached in Webb v. Illi-
nois Central R. R.,r8 which was a suit by a brakeman for injuries sus-
tained when he slipped and fell on a partially covered cinder "about
the size of his fist" embedded in the roadbed. In that case, the Su-
preme Court again held that a jury question was presented, largely
on the ground that the railroad might have discovered the existence
of the clinker if they had used proper inspection methods.
Summary of Points Which .id a Plaintiff in Getting
His Case to the Jury
The implication of these decisions is that the Supreme Court is
manifestly unwilling to invade what it considers to be the jury's func-
tion in FELA litigation. This function is to consider all cases in
which there has been introduced any element, even the most tenuous
one, upon which liability can be based; the scintilla rule has reap-
peared in these cases with renewed vigor. If the plaintiff can show
57. 350 U.S. 898 (1955), reversing 224 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1955).
58. 352 U.S. 512 (1957).
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any particular in which the railroad may have been negligent, he will
not be denied a jury determination because of a lack of evidence on
the question of causation, nor because of his own conduct. If he can
show that the railroad knew of a given condition, or can suggest some
action on the railroad's part which might have prevented the injury,
he will likewise reach the jury.
No attempt has been made to discuss the application of res ipsa
loquitur in these cases, but the doctrine must be at least mentioned.
In the early stages of the administration of FELA, there was con-
siderable confusion among the decisions as to whether the doctrine
was applicable at all in FELA cases; this confusion was doubtless
caused by the body of law that had grown up to the effect that res
ipsa loquitur does not apply to master-servant cases.59 This reason-
ing lost most of its force with the abolition of assumption of risk as
a defense in FELA cases and it can no longer be seriously questioned
that the doctrine is available under the act. The great majority of
cases, particularly the more recent ones, have held that the doctrine
is applicable. 60 The Supreme Court has pointed out that the doctrine
is to be applied primarily to what it calls ". . . extraordinary, not
usual happenings, ..."' the most common of which seem to be de-
railments.62 A detailed examination of the scope of res ipsa loquitur
in FELA cases is beyond the purview of this article, but it must be
at least noted that the doctrine may be applicable, and when that is
the case it will be an additional favorable factor in getting a plain-
tiff's case to the jury.
Finally, mention must be made of the Safety Appliance Acts63 and
the Boiler Inspection Acts.64 The former makes it unlawful to oper-
ate a locomotive not equipped with power brakes or a train not com-
posed of sufficient cars having power brakes so that the train can be
controlled without the use of hand brakes. The act also requires that
automatic couplers be used, and that all cars be equipped with secure
ladders, grab-irons, and running boards. The Boiler Inspection Act
requires railroads to inspect their locomotives and equipment regu-
larly to insure compliance with standards set up by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. It should be noted that a violation of the
specific provisions of these acts imposes absolute liability upon the
59. It was so held in Patton v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 179 U.S. 658, 663 (1901).
60. Jesionowski v. Boston & Me. R.R., 329 U.S. 452 (1947); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Buckles,
232 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1956); see also cases collected in Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 475, 491
(1954).
61. Jesionwski v. Boston & Me. R.R., 329 U.S. 452, 458 (1947).
62. See, e.g., Jesionowski v. Boston & Me. R.R., 329 U.S. 452 (1947); Chicago & No. W.
Ry. v. Green, 164 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1947); Eker v. Pettibone, 110 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1940);
Lowery v. Hocking Valley R.R., 60 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1932).
63. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), 32 Star. 943 (1903), 36 Star. 298 (1910), 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(1952).
64. 36 Stat. 913 (1911), 38 Star. 1192 (1915), 40 Stat. 616 (1918), 43 Stat. 659 (1924),
54 Stat. 148 (1940), 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34 (1952).
[December
NOTES
railroad. 5 The only question then to be passed upon is whether the
violation resulted in the injury complained of - negligence no longer
having a bearing on liability.68 Thus, these acts may also be of im-
portance to a plaintiff in attempting to get his case to the jury.
CONCLUSION
The deluge of FELA cases upon the courts has been tremendous
there were 1,332 cases commenced under that act in the federal
courts during 1956.67 Of these cases, a substantial number reached
the Supreme Court through its exercise of the certiorari power.6 " In
its disposition of those cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly re-
versed lower courts which had taken cases from the jury.69 By these
decisions, the Court has set a standard for the guidance of the in-
ferior tribunals which requires the submission of nearly all cases to
the jury for their determination.
There is no question that these decisions have effected a change
in the traditional role of judge and jury. A companion result, how-
ever, is of even greater import, this being the fact that the expanded
role of the jury has changed the result of a number of cases: any rule
of substantive law or procedure which enlarges the jury's sphere
tends to extend liability.70
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in certain controversies
between the weak and the strong - between a humble individual and
a gigantic corporation, the sympathies of the human mind naturally, hon-
estly, and generally run to the assistance and support of the feeble and
apparently oppressed... il
This fact has caused the Supreme Court decisions in FELA cases to
be characterized as the work of a "judicial Robin Hood."72
65. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. Ry., 317 U.S. 481 (1943).
66. For discussions of these acts see McCold, The Federal Railroad Safety Acts and the
F.E.L.A.: A Comparison, 17 OKIo ST. L.J. 494 (1956), and Loisell & Anderson, The Safety
Appliance Act and the F.E.L.A.: A Plea for Clarification, 18 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 281
(1953).
67. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 542 (1957) (dissenting opinion, per Frank-
furter, J.).
68. See Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1441 (1956); see also cases collected in Rogers v. Missouri
Pac. RR., 352 US.. 500, 548 (1957) (Appendix A to opinion of Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
69. The following Supreme Court decision was announced subsequent to the completion of
this note. Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 28 U.S.L. Week 3119 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1959). Plain-
tiff, a wreck train laborer, sued under FELA alleging that a cross-tie was raised and covered
with grease, thereby causing him to wrench his back. A verdict of $25,000 was returned, and
subsequently set aside by the Ohio Supreme Court, 168 Ohio St. 582, 156 N.E.2d 822 (1959).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and at the same time reversed the decision with direc-
tions to reinstate the jury verdict. The case is a further example of the Court's willingness to let
a case go to the jury on the most minute evidence. There is an informative appendix attached to
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion and a frank dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan. [Ed.]
70. James, Function of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 689 (1949).
71. Haring v. New York & Erie R1R., 13 Barb. 9, 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1853).
72. Wright, The Employers' Liability Act: Does the Supreme Court Want it Repealed?, 45
A.B.A.J. 151, 202 (1959).
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It is true that the judicial interpretation of the act is open to criti-
cism, both because of its imposition of an almost absolute liability
without the commensurate safeguard of liability limits such as are
found in workmen's compensation laws, and because of the danger
that its altered version of the judge-jury function will creep into
other branches of the law. Recent opinions by the Supreme Court
have made it clear that FELA negligence is being interpreted as
something apart from common-law negligence,7 3 thus obviating much
of the danger noted in the latter criticism above. As to the other
criticism, it can only be observed that much of our system of juris-
prudence is entirely dependent in its operation upon the jury system,
and if juries are to be the object of some sort of inherent distrust,
our troubles are much greater than merely those encountered in the
administration of FELA.
The factors which led to the passage of FELA were set forth in
the introduction in an attempt to impart some of the intangible as-
pects - the spirit - of this law. Without this act, railroad workers
were seldom compensated for work-connected injuries; with the act,
the result would have been the same had there been restrictive judi-
cial interpretations. Since there are many situations in which a man
is injured through no fault of his own and yet is able to show little
or no negligence on the part of the railroad, the courts are merely
carrying out the spirit of the statute when they hold that such a
worker's right to recovery must be determined by a jury.
WILLIAM R. BAIRD
73. See, e.g., Singler v. Missouri Pac. R., 356 U.S. 326, 329 (1958).
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